S.R.P. v. USA by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-10-2012 
S.R.P. v. USA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"S.R.P. v. USA" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1065. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1065 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






S.R.P. (a minor), 
by and through Maria Rivera Abunabba  
(as mother and next of kin) 
 
S.R.P., 




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR 
______ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
of the Virgin Islands – Appellate Division 
Division of St. Croix 
(D.C. No. 1-06-cv-00080) 
District Judge:  Honorable Raymond L. Finch 
______ 
 
Argued December 5, 2011 
Before:  FISHER, GREENAWAY, JR. and 




(Filed: April 10, 2012) 
 
Pamela L. Colon (Argued) 
27 & 28 King Cross Street 
Phoenix Court Business Complex 
Christiansted, St. Croix, USVI  00820 
 Counsel for Appellant 
 
Thomas M. Bondy 
Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr. (Argued) 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division 
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, DC  20530 
 
Angela P. Tyson-Floyd 
Office of United States Attorney 
1108 King Street, Suite 201 
Christiansted, VI  00820 
 Counsel for Appellees 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 S.R.P., a minor, appeals from an order of the District 
Court dismissing his claims for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  
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The action arose out of a 2004 incident in which S.R.P. was 
bitten by a barracuda while playing near the shore of Buck 
Island Reef National Monument (“Buck Island Monument” or 
“the Monument”).  S.R.P., through his mother, filed suit 
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., alleging that the 
Government negligently failed to warn of the danger posed by 
barracudas to shallow water bathers.  The District Court 
dismissed the case on the basis that the discretionary function 
exception to the FTCA deprived it of jurisdiction, and thus 
immunized the Government from suit.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
 On May 9, 2004, while sitting on the beach at Buck 
Island (“Buck Island” or “the Island”) with his feet in shallow 
water, then 12-year-old S.R.P. was bitten by a barracuda and 
suffered a severe laceration to his foot.  His third and fourth 
toes were nearly severed and surgery was required to repair 
the damage.  Buck Island is located 1.25 miles off the 
northeast side of the island of St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.  It is a unit of the National Park System under the 
control and management of the National Park Service (“the 
NPS”).  Prior to 2001, Buck Island Monument included Buck 
Island itself and 704 marine acres surrounding the island.  In 
2001, President Clinton issued an executive proclamation 
expanding the boundaries of the Monument, designating the 
surrounding 18,869 marine acres as a protected area, and 
directing the Secretary of the Interior to “prohibit all 
extractive uses.”  Proclamation No. 7392, 66 Fed. Reg. 7336 
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(Jan. 17, 2001).  Pursuant to this directive, in 2003, Buck 
Island and its surrounding waters were closed to fishing. 
 Buck Island is accessible only by watercraft, and is 
open to the public for recreational activities, such as 
swimming, picnicking, hiking, snorkeling, and scuba diving.  
Approximately 55,000 to 60,000 people visit each year.  Most 
tourists travel to the Island via private concessionaries, which 
offer half-day or full-day trips.  Visitors may also access 
Buck Island by private boat, but any owner of a vessel who 
wishes to visit must apply for an anchoring permit.  At the 
time of application, boat owners receive a packet of 
information, including the Buck Island Reef Brochure (“the 
Buck Island brochure”), which provides general information 
about Buck Island, including natural hazards in the area.  A 
portion of the brochure labeled “Safety Tips for Sea and 
Shore” states: 
Reef and marine hazards:  Shallows and reefs 
near shore contain sharp corals, stingrays, spiny 
sea urchins, fire coral, fire worms, and barbed 
snails.  Cuts from marine organisms infect 
quickly, so clean and medicate them.  
Portuguese man-o-war and sea wasps, both 
stinging jellyfish, are rarely found here.  
Barracuda and sharks, if encountered, should be 
treated with caution but are not usually 
aggressive toward snorkelers. 
The same information is posted, in both English and Spanish, 
on signs located at the picnic areas on the Island. 
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 Barracuda is a species of fish indigenous to the 
Caribbean Sea and the waters around Buck Island.  Although 
barracudas are not generally aggressive toward humans, it is 
believed that they may attack humans if they mistake a limb 
or other body appendage for prey.  Prior to the attack at issue 
in this case, NPS officials were aware of only one other 
incident in the previous twenty-two years in which a 
barracuda had bitten a human at or around Buck Island.  In 
that attack, which occurred sometime before 1999, a boat 
captain was bitten while sitting on the side of his boat with 
his feet dangling in the water.  The NPS attributed the attack 
to the boat captain’s pouring fish oil in the water around his 
feet.  At the time he was bitten, there were several snorkelers 
in the water nearby, none of whom were attacked. 
On June 16, 2006, S.R.P., through his mother, brought 
a tort action against the United States under the FTCA, 
alleging that the NPS failed to adequately warn visitors about 
the dangers posed by barracudas, and that the NPS failed to 
properly staff Buck Island.1
                                              
1 S.R.P. does not appeal the District Court’s dismissal 
of his negligent staffing claim. 
  On October 27, 2009, the 
Government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) on the basis that the FTCA’s discretionary function 
exception applied.  After allowing discovery on the 
jurisdictional question, the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
granted the motion to dismiss on October 1, 2010, concluding 
that the discretionary function exception barred S.R.P.’s 
claims because NPS policies gave local NPS officials 
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discretion to craft appropriate warnings regarding potential 
safety hazards, and the question of whether and to what extent 
to warn involved significant policy considerations.  Perez v. 
United States, No. 06-0080, 2010 WL 3927628 (D.V.I. 
Oct. 1, 2010). 
 S.R.P. filed a timely notice of appeal.  His primary 
contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in 
concluding that the discretionary function exception barred 
his claims because the NPS was aware that barracudas posed 
a danger to swimmers, and thus had a non-discretionary duty 
to warn.  He also argues that the District Court failed to apply 
the relaxed standard required for factual challenges to subject 
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), and that the District 
Court improperly shifted to him the burden of proving the 
non-applicability of the discretionary function exception. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
S.R.P.’s complaint invoked the District Court’s 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3), 
1367(a), and the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674 and 1346(b).  We 
have appellate jurisdiction over an appeal from a dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Because the Government’s motion presented a factual 
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the District Court was 
not confined to the allegations in S.R.P.’s complaint, and was 
entitled to independently evaluate the evidence to resolve 
disputes over jurisdictional facts.  Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. 
Airlines, Inc., 303 F.3d 293, 300 n.4 (3d Cir. 2002) (overruled 
on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. China 
Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011)); Mortensen v. 
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First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 
1977).  We exercise plenary review over the applicability of 
the discretionary function exception.  Merando v. United 
States, 517 F.3d 160, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review the 
District Court’s findings of fact related to jurisdiction for 
clear error.  CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 
2008).  We exercise plenary review in determining whether 
the District Court applied the correct standard in evaluating a 
motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1) and whether it placed the burden of proof on the 
proper party.  See id. 
III.  Discussion 
 A. The Federal Tort Claims Act Framework 
 The United States, “as a sovereign, is immune from 
suit unless it consents to be sued.”  Merando, 517 F.3d at 164 
(citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).  
The FTCA is a “partial abrogation” of that immunity, Gotha 
v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1997), and 
permits suits against the United States for torts committed by 
“any employee of the Government while acting within the 
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances 
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable 
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where 
the act or omission occurred,” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).  The 
FTCA, however, “imposes a significant limitation,” Gotha, 
115 F.3d at 179, by providing that the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346 shall not apply to: 
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[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an 
employee of the Government, exercising due 
care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or regulation be 
valid, or based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the discretion 
involved be abused. 
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 
This discretionary function exception “marks the 
boundary between Congress’ willingness to impose tort 
liability upon the United States and its desire to protect 
certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by 
private individuals.”  United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao 
Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 
(1984).  The exception “does not apply to every situation in 
which there is an actual option to choose between courses of 
action or inaction.”  Gotha, 115 F.3d at 179.  Rather, it 
immunizes from second-guessing “legislative and 
administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and 
political policy.”  Id. (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814). 
 As a threshold matter, before determining whether the 
discretionary function exception applies, a court must identify 
the conduct at issue.  Merando, 517 F.3d at 165.  The court 
must then follow a two-step inquiry to determine whether the 
discretionary function exception immunizes the government 
from a suit arising out of such conduct.  Id. at 164.  “First, a 
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court must determine whether the act giving rise to the 
alleged injury and thus the suit involve[d] an ‘element of 
judgment or choice.’”  Id. (citing United States v. Gaubert, 
499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991)).  If a “federal statute, regulation, or 
policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an 
employee to follow,” the exception does not apply because 
“the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the 
directive.”  Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 
(1988).  However, where a specific course of action is not 
prescribed, we proceed to the second step, which requires us 
to determine “whether the challenged action or inaction ‘is of 
the kind that the discretionary function exception was 
designed to shield.’”  Gotha, 115 F.3d at 179 (quoting 
Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).  “Because the purpose of the 
exception is to prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of 
legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, 
economic, and political policy . . . the exception protects only 
governmental actions and decisions based on considerations 
of public policy.”  Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323 (internal marks 
and citations omitted).  The “focus of the inquiry is not on the 
agent’s subjective intent in exercising the discretion conferred 
by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the actions taken 
and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.”  Id. at 
325. 
Although a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing 
that his claims fall within the scope of the FTCA’s waiver of 
the federal government’s sovereign immunity (i.e., that the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) are met), the 
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Government has the burden of proving the applicability of the 
discretionary function exception.2
                                              
2 We recognize that at least one of our sister circuits 
holds that where the Government raises the discretionary 
function exception, the plaintiff bears the burden to prove that 
the exception does not apply.  See Aragon v. United States, 
146 F.3d 819, 823 (10th Cir. 1998).  Several other courts of 
appeals have declined to decide the issue.  See St. Tammany 
Parish v. FEMA, 556 F.3d 307, 315 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(collecting cases).  We acknowledge that the Supreme Court’s 
statement in United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 324-25 
(1991), that “[f]or a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, 
it must allege facts which would support a finding that the 
challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said 
to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime” creates 
some uncertainty as to where the Court intended to place the 
burden. 
  Merando, 517 F.3d at 164. 
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 B. The Applicability of the Discretionary 
Function Exception 
 We turn now to S.R.P.’s contention that the District 
Court erred in concluding that the challenged conduct is 
protected by the discretionary function exception. 
1. 
 Before engaging in the two-part discretionary function 
analysis, we must identify the challenged conduct.  Merando, 
517 F.3d at 165.  S.R.P.’s complaint states: 
                                                                                                     
However, absent an explicit statement from the 
Supreme Court that the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden, we 
continue to believe that the burden of proving the 
applicability of the discretionary function exception is most 
appropriately placed on the Government.  Although the 
discretionary function exception is jurisdictional on its face, it 
is analogous to an affirmative defense.  Therefore, just as a 
plaintiff cannot be expected to disprove every affirmative 
defense that a defendant could potentially raise, so too should 
a plaintiff not be expected to disprove every exception to the 
FTCA.  Moreover, the Government will generally be in the 
best position to prove facts relevant to the applicability of the 
discretionary function exception.  Our view is in accord with 
that of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits.  See Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 
702 (9th Cir. 1992); Carlyle v. United States, 674 F.2d 554, 
556 (6th Cir. 1982); Stewart v. United States, 199 F.2d 517, 
520 (7th Cir. 1952). 
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Defendant NPS created and or maintained a 
dangerous condition on Buck Island in that 
there were no signs on the premises of Buck 
Island warning visitors of the existence of 
barracudas and/or large predatory fish on or 
near the premises of Buck Island. . . . At all 
times relevant herein, Defendant NPS knew or 
should have known of the dangerous conditions 
it created on Buck Island. 
Despite the broad language of his complaint, S.R.P. does not 
allege that the NPS provided no warnings at all regarding the 
presence of barracudas in the waters surrounding Buck Island.  
He acknowledges that the Buck Island Reef Brochure states 
that “[b]arracuda and sharks, if encountered, should be treated 
with caution but are not usually aggressive toward 
snorkelers.”  Instead, he claims that such warnings, by their 
terms, apply only to snorkelers, and are therefore inadequate 
to advise shallow water bathers of the risk of a barracuda 
attack.  Thus, he alleges that the NPS was negligent in failing 
to adequately warn visitors about the possibility of a shoreline 
barracuda attack. 
A key dispute in this case is the extent of the NPS’s 
knowledge regarding the dangers posed by barracudas.  
S.R.P. argues that the NPS was aware that barracudas might 
attack shoreline swimmers.  The Government, however, 
maintains that although NPS officials were aware in the most 
general sense that barracudas could be dangerous to humans, 
they had no information to suggest that barracudas posed a 
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risk to shoreline swimmers specifically.3
2. 
  Accordingly, the 
conduct at issue is the NPS’s judgment regarding whether to 
provide warnings and the extent of any such warnings, in 
light of the information available. 
 We must first determine whether a statute, regulation, 
or other policy required the NPS to warn of hazardous 
conditions in a specific manner, or whether the NPS’s actions 
were discretionary because they involved an “element of 
judgment or choice.”  Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322.  After 
reviewing the applicable policies, we are convinced that NPS 
officials are explicitly vested with broad discretion regarding 
the manner in which to warn the public of dangerous 
conditions in national parks. 
 Under the NPS Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1, the NPS is 
charged with 
promot[ing] and regulat[ing] the use of . . . 
national parks . . . by such means and measures 
as conform to the fundamental purpose of the 
said parks, . . . which purpose is to conserve the 
scenery and the natural and historic objects and 
                                              
3 We review the District Court’s findings of fact 
related to jurisdiction for clear error.  CNA v. United States, 
535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008).  The District Court agreed 
with the Government’s position and as we will explain later, 
the District Court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. 
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the wild life therein and to provide for the 
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for 
the enjoyment of future generations. 
To implement this statutory directive, the NPS has adopted 
various policies and internal operating procedures, including 
those related to public safety and signage.  The 2001 NPS 
Management Policies (“Management Policies” or “the 
Policies”) provides: 
While recognizing that there are limitations on 
its capability to totally eliminate all hazards, the 
Service . . . will seek to provide a safe and 
healthful environment for visitors and 
employees. . . . The Service will strive to 
identify recognizable threats to the safety and 
health of persons and to the protection of 
property. . . . When practicable, and consistent 
with congressionally designated purposes and 
mandates, the Service will reduce or remove 
known hazards and apply other appropriate 
measures, including closures, guarding, signing, 
or other forms of education.  In doing so, the 
Service’s preferred actions will be those that 
have the least impact on park resources and 
values. 
National Park Service, 2001 Management Policies, at 
¶ 8.2.5.1 (2001) (emphasis added). 
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The Management Policies thus clearly envision a 
system in which NPS officials will attempt to strike a balance 
between preservation of a park’s scenery and natural 
resources and public safety.  However, the Policies do not 
specifically dictate the way in which park officials should 
balance these concerns or the specific actions that must be 
taken in response to particular problems.  In fact, the Policies 
provides: 
These management policies do not impose park-
specific visitor safety prescriptions.  The means 
by which public safety concerns are to be 
addressed is left to the discretion of 
superintendents and other decision-makers at 
the park level, who must work within the limits 
of funding and staffing.  Examples include 
decisions about whether to install warning signs 
or artificial lighting; distribute weather 
warnings or advisories; . . . eliminate potentially 
dangerous animals; close roads and trails; or 
install guardrails and fences[.] 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 These policy statements clearly vest local NPS 
officials with broad discretion to develop appropriate 
responses to natural hazards, including the posting of signs, 
based on a weighing of the applicable policy interests. 
The NPS Sign Manual provides:  “the individual park 
manager . . . has the responsibility for determining whether or 
not a sign is necessary or appropriate at a given location.  The 
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decision to utilize a particular sign at a particular location 
requires the professional judgment of the park manager[.]”  
National Park Service Sign Manual, at ¶ 1-1 (Jan. 1988).  In 
making such decisions, park officials are to “bear in mind 
long standing NPS policy to minimally intrude upon the 
natural or historic setting in National Park System areas, and 
to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of signs, while striving 
to ensure for the safety of park visitors.”  Id.  The 
Management Policies further provides that “[s]igns will be 
held to the minimum number, size, and wording required to 
serve their intended functions.”  Management Policies, at 
¶ 9.3.1.1.  As these policies make evident, local NPS officials 
are afforded discretion both as to whether to post warning 
signs and as to the content of such signs.  Accordingly, we 
hold that no statute, regulation, or policy mandated any 
particular method for warning about marine hazards at Buck 
Island.4
 Our conclusion is in accord with those of other courts 
that have addressed the issue.  As the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit explained in Blackburn v. United States, 
“the [NPS] policy manuals’ broad mandate to warn the public 
of and protect it from special hazards involves the exercise of 
discretion in identifying such hazards, in determining which 
  The NPS’s “decisions as to the precise manner in 
which to do so, and its execution of those decisions,” 
Merando, 517 F.3d at 168, were discretionary because they 
involved an “element of judgment or choice,” see Gaubert, 
499 U.S. at 322. 
                                              
4 S.R.P. has not identified any Buck Island-specific 
policies or regulations that would dictate a different result. 
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hazards require an explicit warning and in determining the 
precise manner in which to warn it of those hazards.”  100 
F.3d 1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).  “Because 
the NPS cannot apprise the public of every potential danger 
posed by every feature of [a national park], a degree of 
judgment is required in order to determine which hazards 
require an explicit warning and which hazards speak for 
themselves.”  Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177, 1180 
(9th Cir. 1995); see also Terbush v. United States, 516 F.3d 
1125, 1128, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that the decision 
not to post warning signs regarding a recent rockfall at 
Yosemite National Park was discretionary); Elder v. United 
States, 312 F.3d 1172, 1176-80 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding 
that the decision whether to post additional signs warning of 
the danger of algae in streams at Zion National Park was 
discretionary); Shanksy v. United States, 164 F.3d 688, 690, 
692 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the NPS’s decision as to 
whether to post warning signs at the exit of a historical 
building was discretionary). 
3. 
Having concluded that no statute, regulation, or policy 
mandates specific action by NPS officials with respect to 
warning signs on Buck Island, we must now determine 
whether the discretionary judgment afforded to NPS is “of the 
kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to 
shield.”  Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.  Only those decisions 
“susceptible to policy analysis” are protected by the 
exception.  Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325.  We begin by noting 
that “[w]hen established governmental policy, as expressed or 
implied by statute, regulation, or agency guidelines, allows a 
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Government agent to exercise discretion, it must be presumed 
that the agent’s acts are grounded in policy when exercising 
that discretion.”  Id. at 324.  That presumption, however, can 
be rebutted.  Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749, 755 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2000).  In fact, we have made clear that 
“susceptibility analysis is not a toothless standard that the 
[G]overnment can satisfy merely by associating a decision 
with a regulatory concern.”  Id. at 755 (internal marks and 
citation omitted).  Rather, the Government must establish that 
the challenged conduct is “grounded in the policy of the 
regulatory regime,” and “based on the purposes that the . . . 
regime seeks to accomplish,” Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 & n.7.  
In other words, there must be a “rational nexus” between the 
Government’s decision and “social, economic, and political 
concerns.”  Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 759. 
We conclude that the NPS’s decision not to post 
additional warning signs or add language to existing warning 
signs regarding the danger of a shoreline barracuda attack is 
susceptible to policy analysis because in determining the 
number, size, and content of warning signs, the NPS had to 
weigh the potential benefits of additional warnings against the 
costs of such warnings, including the risk of numbing Buck 
Island visitors to all warnings.  Such a determination is 
directly related to the NPS’s mission of preserving national 
parks while ensuring public safety and is thus firmly 
“grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.”  See 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325. 
Buck Island is an offshore island in a “wild open ocean 
circumstance,” in which virtually unlimited natural hazards 
are present, and the NPS must make a policy determination as 
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to which dangers are significant enough to merit specific 
attention on a warning sign.  We have previously held that 
assessments of the respective degrees of risk presented by 
natural hazards and decisions regarding appropriate responses 
to such risks are susceptible to policy analysis.  For example, 
in Merando v. United States, the plaintiffs challenged the 
manner in which the NPS located and removed hazardous 
trees.  517 F.3d at 162.  In finding the discretionary function 
exception applicable, we stated that “knowing that it could 
not inspect every tree in the Park, the Park Service decided to 
expend the bulk of its resources on high-visitor use areas.”  
Id. at 174.  Likewise, in Mitchell v. United States, 225 F.3d 
361, 363, 366 (3d Cir. 2000), we held that the NPS’s choice 
not to repair or improve a drainage ditch and concrete head-
wall located near a paved roadway was susceptible to policy 
analysis because the NPS “was forced to determine priorities 
among the desirable improvements” and “repair the most 
urgent problems first.”  We explained that, compared to other 
problems with the roadway, the defect complained of by the 
plaintiff presented only a “low risk of accident.”  Id. at 366. 
Similarly, here, knowing that it could not warn of 
every potential hazard at Buck Island, the NPS decided to 
focus on those it reasonably believed posed the most 
significant threat to visitors.  Moreover, too many warning 
signs and brochures “would inevitably reduce the impact of 
the individual warnings on the public,” Valdez, 56 F.3d at 
1180, as would excessive warnings on any individual sign.  
Once an agency identifies a hazard, it “must then balance that 
risk against the cost of warning about that hazard and the 
possibility of overloading visitors with unnecessary 
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warnings.”  Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *12 (citations 
omitted).  Such a judgment represents precisely the type of 
policy choice that the discretionary function exception 
prohibits us from second-guessing.  Accordingly, we reject 
S.R.P.’s contention that once the Government decides to 
warn, it is no longer protected by the discretionary function 
exception.  The exception protects both the decision whether 
to warn and decisions regarding the scope and content of such 
warnings.  We agree with the District Court that “Congress 
[did not] create[] the discretionary function exception only to 
force the NPS into the Catch-22 of choosing between issuing 
no warnings at all and posting warnings about every 
conceivable danger, no matter how remote or hypothetical.”  
Id. at *14; see Shanksy, 164 F.3d at 694 (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s argument that once the Government “decided to 
effectuate some modern safety measures, it became obliged to 
take all feasible safety measures”).  Even if S.R.P. is 
advocating only for the incorporation of additional language 
regarding barracudas into existing warning signs, “such a 
change would necessitate a chain of further decisions,” Elder, 
312 F.3d at 1183, including whether to explain how to 
identify barracudas, and whether to offer detailed advice 
about what someone should do if he or she encounters a 
barracuda.  Indeed, in his brief, S.R.P. argues that the Buck 
Island brochure should have explained in greater detail what 
it means to treat barracudas with “caution.”5
                                              
5 At her deposition, Zandy Hillis-Starr, the local NPS 
official responsible for overseeing marine research in St. 




The Government draws our attention to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Elder v. United 
States, 312 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2002), which is instructive 
because it presents a factual scenario strikingly similar to that 
in our case.  The suit in Elder arose out of a 1997 incident, in 
which a twelve-year-old boy died while attempting to cross a 
stream at the Middle Emerald Pools in Zion National Park.  
Id. at 1174.  As he stepped into the stream, the boy slipped on 
slick algae, slid downstream, fell over a ledge, and plunged 
more than 100 feet onto the rocks below.  Id.  Along the trail 
to the Middle Emerald Pools, there were numerous signs 
warning visitors of various hazards and cautioning visitors to 
stay on the trail.  Id. at 1174-75.  No signs specifically 
mentioned the danger of algae in the streams.  Id. at 1175.  
Nor were there any barriers preventing visitors from leaving 
the trail and walking into the stream.  Id.  After the accident, 
the plaintiffs brought suit against the United States under the 
FTCA, alleging that the NPS was negligent for failing to 
specifically warn of the algae hazard and for failing to 
provide adequate barriers to prevent visitors from falling over 
the ledge.  Id. at 1176.  In response to the Government’s 
                                                                                                     
not approach [a wild animal], to not threaten it, to not be 
aggressive toward it . . . [t]o observe it quietly, and to move 
away if you feel at all threatened.”  S.R.P. apparently wants 
this common sense definition included in the Buck Island 
brochure.  Although the adequacy of the language in the 
brochure relates more directly to S.R.P.’s underlying 
negligence claim, we note that a warning brochure cannot be 
expected to include a definition of every term therein. 
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motion to dismiss based on the discretionary function 
exception, the plaintiffs argued that decisions regarding 
barriers and signs at the Middle Emerald Pools involved no 
policy considerations because park officials’ sole 
consideration should have been park safety.  Id. at 1181.  The 
Tenth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “park officials must 
weigh the cost of safety measures against the additional safety 
that will be achieved.  Even inexpensive signs may not be 
worth their cost.”  Id.  Additionally, “in a national park whose 
purpose is to preserve nature and display beauty to the public, 
any safety measure must be weighed against damage to 
natural resources and aesthetic values.”  Id. 
We acknowledge that if the discretionary function 
exception is given an overly broad construction, it could 
easily swallow the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign 
immunity and frustrate the purpose of the statute.  
Accordingly, we have held that where the Government is 
aware of a specific risk and responding to that risk would 
only require the Government to take garden-variety remedial 
steps, the discretionary function exception does not apply.  
Finding that such cases are outside the scope of the 
discretionary function exception is consistent with the 
primary purpose of the FTCA.  Cestonaro, 211 F.3d at 755.  
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[u]ppermost in the 
collective mind of Congress [when it passed the FTCA] were 
the ordinary common-law torts.”  Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953) (partially overruled on other grounds 
by Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957)).  
“[C]ongressional thought was centered on granting relief for 
the run-of-the-[mill] accidents,” id. at 28 n.19, which 
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occurred due to the Government’s failure to take basic steps 
to alleviate specific safety concerns.  In such a situation, the 
Government’s conduct is analogous to that of a private citizen 
who fails to take appropriate action to ensure the safety of 
visitors on his or her property, and thus no broad public 
policy concerns are implicated. 
In arguing that the NPS’s decision regarding warning 
signage at Buck Island was analogous to an “ordinary 
common law-tort[],” id. at 28, and thus not susceptible to 
policy analysis, S.R.P. relies on our decisions in Gotha v. 
United States, 115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 1997), and Cestonaro v. 
United States, 211 F.3d 749 (3d Cir. 2000).  Because the key 
distinctions between those cases and our case are factual, we 
will review them in some detail.  In Gotha, we addressed 
whether the United States Navy’s failure to install a handrail 
or lighting on a steep pathway at a Navy facility in the Virgin 
Islands was protected by the discretionary function exception.  
115 F.3d at 178.  In that case, the plaintiff fell and injured her 
ankle while walking on an unlit, unpaved path approximately 
fifteen to twenty feet in length, which dropped downward at a 
steep angle.  Id.  She brought suit against the Government 
under the FTCA, alleging that the Navy was negligent for 
failing to provide a stairway with handrails and for neglecting 
to provide sufficient lighting on the pathway.  Id.  
Significantly, there was evidence that the Navy was aware of 
the risk because it had been asked on several previous 
occasions to build a stairway or install handrails.  Id. at 180.  
The Government moved to dismiss under the discretionary 
function exception, claiming that the Navy’s actions were 
motivated by “military, social, and economic considerations.”  
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Id. at 181.  The Government claimed that the Navy’s decision 
was informed by the need to train in a “realistic warfare 
environment,” as well as economic factors, such as budgetary 
constraints, procurement regulations, and the anticipated 
service life of the facility.  Id.  In rejecting the Government’s 
argument and holding that the challenged conduct fell outside 
the scope of the discretionary function exception, we 
observed that the case was “not about a national security 
concern, but rather a mundane, administrative, garden-
variety, housekeeping problem that [was] about as far 
removed from the policies applicable to the Navy’s mission 
as . . . possible.”  Id.  We opined that “it [was] difficult to 
conceive of a case more likely to have been within the 
contemplation of Congress when it abrogated sovereign 
immunity than the case before us.”  Id. at 182.  Accordingly, 
we concluded that “the challenged actions [were] not the kind 
of conduct that [could] be said to be grounded in the policy of 
the regulatory regime.”  Id. at 181-82 (quoting Gaubert, 499 
U.S. at 325). 
 In Cestonaro, while vacationing with his family, 
Daniele Cestonaro was shot and killed in a parking lot in 
Christiansted on the island of St. Croix.  211 F.3d at 751.  The 
parking lot fell within the boundaries of the Christiansted 
National Historic Site, which was owned and controlled by 
the National Park Service.  Id.  The plaintiff (Cestonaro’s 
wife) brought suit under the FTCA, alleging that the NPS was 
negligent for failing to provide adequate lighting and warning 
signs in the lot.  Id. at 752.  The district court dismissed the 
action based on the discretionary function exception, finding 
that the NPS’s challenged decisions were grounded in its 
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mission to “safeguard the natural and historic integrity of 
national parks” while “minimally intrud[ing] upon the setting 
of such parks.”  Id. at 752 (citation omitted).  We reversed, 
reasoning that the NPS’s decision was not related to any of 
the overarching policies cited by the district court.  Id. at 756.  
Rather, the case involved a tort stemming from a garden 
variety decision not to implement safety measures, even 
though the NPS was aware that crimes had occurred in the 
lot, and had received regular complaints from local business 
owners about the safety of the lot.  Id. at 751, 755.  We stated 
that a suit based on such actions was precisely the type of 
case Congress contemplated when it abrogated sovereign 
immunity by passing the FTCA, id. at 755-56, and thus, we 
held that the Government could not “seek shelter under the 
discretionary function exception,” id. at 759. 
 Decisions from other courts support our view that 
where the Government is aware of a specific risk of harm, 
and eliminating the danger would not implicate policy but 
would involve only garden-variety remedial measures, the 
discretionary function exception does not apply.  For 
example, in Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 896, 898 
(10th Cir. 1989), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not 
apply where the Army Corps of Engineers created a reservoir, 
but failed to warn swimmers who regularly used a section of 
the lake that motorboats also used the area.  The court 
reasoned that the alleged failure to warn swimmers of a 
dangerous condition in a popular swimming area did not 
implicate any social, economic, or political policy judgments.  
Id. at 898.  Similarly, in Oberson v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 514 
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F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that where the Forest Service was 
aware that two snowmobiles had recently collided on a steep 
portion of a snowmobile track, the Forest Service’s failure to 
post a warning or otherwise remedy the hazard was not 
protected by the discretionary function exception.  Likewise, 
in George v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1524, 1528, 1533 
(M.D. Ala. 1990), the U.S. District Court for the Middle 
District of Alabama concluded that where at least six 
incidents of “aggressive alligator behavior” in a swimming 
area had been reported to various park officials, the Forest 
Service was on specific notice of the danger and its failure to 
take remedial measures was not within the ambit of the 
discretionary function exception.  See also Fabend v. 
Rosewood Hotels & Resorts, L.L.C., 174 F. Supp. 2d 356, 
360, n.10 (D.V.I. 2001) (noting that the hazard in that case 
was “well-defined and specific, not a nebulous or hidden 
danger” and stating that “[w]here the danger is specific rather 
than merely potential, the discretionary function exception 




In our case, unlike Gotha, Cestonaro, and the other 
cases cited above, the NPS was not aware of a specific risk.6
 The District Court explained that although NPS 
officials recognized that shoreline swimmers might encounter 
a barracuda, there was no evidence that the presence of 
barracudas near the shore was a danger to the public.  The 
District Court noted that “out of hundreds of thousands of 
  
Thus, S.R.P.’s reliance on those cases is misplaced.  The 
District Court found that although the NPS was aware in a 
general sense that barracudas were potentially dangerous, 
there was no evidence that NPS officials were or should have 
been specifically aware of the risk of a shallow-water attack.  
We review this finding for clear error.  CNA, 535 F.3d at 139.  
Under the clearly erroneous standard, we may not substitute 
our findings for those of the trial court.  Scully v. US WATS, 
Inc., 238 F.3d 497, 506 (3d Cir. 2001).  Rather, we are limited 
to assessing whether there is enough evidence on the record 
to support those findings.  Id.  “That a different set of 
inferences could be drawn from the record is not 
determinative.  It is sufficient that the District Court findings 
of fact could be reasonably inferred from the entire [] record.”  
Id. (citations omitted). 
                                              
6 Although NPS decisions regarding whether and to 
what extent to warn the public of the dangers posed by 
wildlife will generally be susceptible to policy analysis, it is 
possible that the NPS could be aware of a safety hazard so 
blatant that its failure to warn the public could not reasonably 
be said to involve policy considerations.  Therefore, we will 
review the extent of the NPS’s knowledge in this case. 
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Buck Island visitors over the last several decades, [S.R.P.] 
was the first close-to-shore bather bitten by a barracuda.”  
Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *6.  Zandy Hillis-Starr, the local 
NPS official in charge of overseeing marine research in St. 
Croix, testified in her deposition that she was unaware of any 
prior barracuda attack on the Buck Island shoreline.  The only 
barracuda attack of which the NPS was aware was an attack 
that occurred in deeper water and involved a boat captain 
dumping fish oil into the water while dangling his feet over 
the edge of a boat. 
 S.R.P. argues, however, that the District Court ignored 
substantial evidence indicating that the NPS knew that 
barracudas posed a serious risk to shallow-water swimmers.  
First, S.R.P. notes that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision 
to prohibit fishing in the waters surrounding Buck Island was 
expected to increase the barracuda population in the area, thus 
making an attack more likely.  Second, he asserts that the 
Buck Island brochure’s and beach signage’s advisory to 
snorkelers to treat barracudas “with caution” indicates that 
NPS officials were aware that barracudas were potentially 
dangerous to humans.  Third, he finds fault with the NPS’s 
decision, after the attack on the boat captain, to warn 
concessionaires not to feed the fish or put leftover food in the 
water, but not to issue a similar warning to beachgoers.  
Finally, S.R.P. claims that NPS officials were aware that 
splashing in the “shallows” was a risk factor which increases 
the likelihood of a barracuda attack. 
 S.R.P.’s arguments are unpersuasive.  Based on the 
evidence before the District Court, its finding that NPS 
officials were unaware of the specific risk of a shoreline 
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barracuda attack was not clearly erroneous.  First, the fact that 
a boat captain in deeper water was attacked years earlier after 
pouring fish oil into the water does not suggest that an 
individual would be attacked while sitting on the beach with 
his feet in the water without any similar substance around 
him.  In fact, when the boat captain was attacked, there were 
several snorkelers in the area, none of whom were bitten.  
Thus, the presence of fish oil around the boat captain’s feet 
seems to have been a significant factor in the attack.  Second, 
as to S.R.P.’s argument that the fishing ban should have put 
officials on notice that a barracuda attack was more likely, the 
record indicates that local NPS officials actually disagreed as 
to whether the fishing ban would result in an increase in the 
barracuda population.  However, even if the ban did lead to 
such an increase, because barracudas were not thought to be 
aggressive toward swimmers, the NPS would have had no 
reason to anticipate an increased likelihood of attack.  Third, 
although the Buck Island brochure advised snorkelers to treat 
barracudas “with caution,” the same brochure stated that 
barracudas are not generally aggressive toward humans.  
Finally, S.R.P.’s claim that the NPS was aware that splashing 
in the shallows could lead to a barracuda attack is somewhat 
misleading.  Although Hillis-Starr testified in her deposition 
that “splashing in the shallows” was a recognized risk factor 
for barracuda attacks, she made this statement while 
discussing the attack on the boat captain.  She did not indicate 
that such behavior could lead to a barracuda attack on the 
shoreline.  In fact, she specifically stated that it was the 
combination of pouring fish oil into the water and splashing 
that led to the attack.  Hillis-Starr hypothesized that the 
barracuda likely mistook the boat captain’s feet for food. 
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The key question under Gotha and Cestonaro is not 
whether the Government was aware of danger in the most 
general sense, but whether it was on notice of a specific 
hazard.  With no shoreline barracuda attacks in the twenty-
two years preceding the attack on S.R.P., the District Court 
did not err in finding that NPS officials had no knowledge 
that such an attack was likely. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the NPS was aware of the 
risk, a plaintiff proceeding under the FTCA can only invoke 
Gotha and Cestonaro where responding to the known hazard 
would only require the Government to take garden-variety 
action, such as putting up a rail or installing additional 
lighting, which does not implicate any overarching policy 
concerns.  As we explained above, the NPS’s determination 
regarding the content of warning signs on Buck Island 
involved significant policy considerations.  Thus, under 
Gotha and Cestonaro, neither condition for finding the 
challenged conduct outside the scope of the discretionary 
function exception is present in this case. 
 C. Burden of Proof and Standards for Rule 
12(b)(1) Motion 
 
 Although our review of the District Court’s legal 
conclusions is plenary, Merando, 517 F.3d at 163-64, because 
our analysis – especially under Gotha and Cestonaro – relies 
heavily on the District Court’s factual findings, which we 
review only for clear error, CNA, 535 F.3d at 139, we now 
address S.R.P.’s arguments that, in reaching those findings, 
the District Court improperly shifted the burden of proving 
the applicability of the discretionary function exception and 
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failed to apply a relaxed standard that we have held is 
required when assessing factual challenges to jurisdiction 
under Rule 12(b)(1). 
1. 
S.R.P. argues that the District Court improperly 
required him to prove that the discretionary function did not 
apply, rather than requiring the Government to prove that it 
did apply.  See Merando, 517 F.3d at 164 (stating that the 
Government bears the burden of proving the applicability of 
the discretionary function exception).  We disagree.  The 
District Court correctly explained that the burden was on the 
Government, Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *4, and held the 
Government to its burden.  Cf. Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United 
States, 220 F.3d 169, 179 n.8 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that 
failure to identify the governing standard suggests that the 
district court may not have applied that standard). 
Pointing to the District Court’s statement that 
“[p]laintiff has presented little evidence that the NPS had 
identified barracuda[s] as posing a serious risk to shallow 
water bathers[,]” Perez, 2010 WL 3927628, at *6, S.R.P. 
contends that rather than requiring the Government to 
establish each prong of the discretionary function exception, 
the District Court assessed the sufficiency of his evidence and 
improperly rejected his claim that the NPS was aware of a 
specific risk of shoreline barracuda attacks.  According to 
S.R.P., the District Court should have first determined that the 
Government was mandated to act in the face of a known 
hazard and then required the Government to establish that it 
did not know of the hazard.  S.R.P.’s argument glosses over a 
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critical detail.  Before proceeding to the two-prong 
discretionary function analysis, the District Court was 
required to identify the conduct at issue, and in conducting 
this threshold inquiry, it properly looked at all of the evidence 
in the case.  The way in which the District Court proceeded 
was entirely consistent with our approach in Merando.  See 
517 F.3d at 162-69.  In that case, the plaintiff argued that the 
Government had negligently pruned a tree, and then failed to 
find and remove the hazardous tree, causing it to fall on his 
wife and daughter, tragically killing them.  Id. at 162.  We 
found that the plaintiff’s allegation was unsupportable 
because he had “not shown that the Government was in any 
way involved in the [pruning] of the tree.”  Id. at 167.  We 
thus “eliminate[d]” the plaintiff’s claim that the Government 
negligently pruned the tree and confined our analysis to the 
plaintiff’s challenge to the Government’s alleged failure to 
find and remove the tree.  Id. at 168.  Similarly, the District 
Court here was required to distinguish between S.R.P.’s claim 
that the NPS was aware of a specific danger and failed to 
warn, and his claim that the NPS failed to identify the danger 
and warn accordingly.  As in Merando, this distinction was 
relevant because the nature of the conduct at issue dictates the 
policy considerations that are implicated. 
S.R.P. maintains that because the burden of proof was 
on the Government, he was entitled to all reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn from the evidence.  This 
argument, however, conflates the placement of the burden of 
proof with the standard of review.  The fact that the burden of 
proof is on the Government does not mean that a district court 
is required to apply a summary judgment standard and draw 
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all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.  Cf. Bouriez v. 
Carnegie Mellon Univ., 585 F.3d 765, 770 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(setting forth summary judgment standard under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56).  In fact, we have explicitly rejected 
such an approach to evaluating factual challenges to 
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).  
See Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 300 n.4.  The district court is the 
ultimate finder of fact on the jurisdictional question and is 
thus entitled to draw inferences in favor of the defendant if it 
determines that the evidence warrants such inferences.  See 
Merando, 517 F.3d at 167-68 (explaining that the evidence 
did not allow us to draw the inference, favorable to the 
plaintiff, that the NPS was involved in pruning the tree).  As 
we explained above, the evidence in this case did not warrant 
a finding that the NPS had identified barracudas as posing a 
danger to shoreline bathers. 
2. 
S.R.P. also argues that the District Court applied the 
incorrect standard in evaluating the Government’s motion to 
dismiss.  Specifically, he contends that the District Court was 
required, but failed, to apply a relaxed standard.  We disagree; 
the standard S.R.P. alleges was erroneously applied is not 
applicable where, as here, the Government bears the burden 
of proof. 
When a district court considers a factual challenge to 
subject matter jurisdiction, the court “accords the plaintiff’s 
allegations no presumption of truth.”  Turicentro, 303 F.3d at 
300 n.4 (citations omitted).  “[T]he plaintiff must either prove 
the truth of the [necessary jurisdictional facts] or stand by 
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while the court evaluates those allegations in the same way a 
jury would evaluate [those facts] as part of [the] plaintiff’s 
case on the merits.”  Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.  “In a 
factual attack, the court must weigh the evidence relating to 
jurisdiction, with discretion to allow affidavits, documents, 
and even limited evidentiary hearings.”  Turicentro, 303 F.3d 
at 300 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 As we have previously observed, in a factual attack 
under the FTCA, “the split between jurisdiction and the 
merits is not always clear.”  CNA, 535 F.3d at 141.  There 
will frequently be overlapping issues of proof, causing the 
jurisdictional challenge to be “intertwined with the merits.”  
Id. at 143.  This case presents precisely such a situation 
because many of the same facts that are relevant to the 
question of whether the discretionary function exception 
applies are also relevant to the merits question of whether the 
NPS was negligent in developing warning signs for Buck 
Island.  Recognizing that Rule 12(b)(1) does not provide 
plaintiffs the procedural safeguards of Rule 12(b)(6), such as 
assuming the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations, we have 
articulated a relaxed standard of proof for the jurisdictional 
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question where jurisdiction is intertwined with the merits.7
                                              
7 We note that several of our sister circuits disagree 
with our approach, and require district courts to treat Rule 
12(b)(1) motions to dismiss where jurisdiction is intertwined 
with the merits as challenges on the merits.  See Lawrence v. 
Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990) (explaining 
that, in such a situation, a district court is constrained by the 
limitations of summary judgment practice); Williamson v. 
Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Where the 
defendant’s challenge to the court’s jurisdiction is also a 
challenge to the existence of a federal cause of action, the 
proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that 
jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct 
attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s case.”).  S.R.P.’s 
reliance on these cases, however, is misplaced because we 
take a different approach to cases where the jurisdictional 
question is intertwined with the merits. 
  
See Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.  In such a case, a district 
court may determine whether jurisdiction exists without 
reaching the merits “so long as the court ‘demands less in the 
way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a 
trial stage.’”  Gould Electronics, 220 F.3d at 178 (quoting 
Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891).  “By requiring less of a factual 
showing than would be required to succeed at trial, [we] 
ensure that [district courts] do not prematurely grant Rule 
12(b)(1) motions to dismiss claims in which jurisdiction is 
intertwined with the merits and could be established, along 
with the merits, given the benefit of discovery.”  See CNA, 
535 F.3d at 145. 
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 S.R.P. argues that in concluding that the Government 
had not identified barracudas as posing a risk to shallow 
water bathers, the District Court failed to apply this relaxed 
standard.8
Although we have applied that standard to other cases 
brought under the FTCA, those cases are distinguishable 
because they involved threshold requirements under 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), for which the plaintiff bears the burden 
  We have never directly addressed the role of this 
standard where, as here, the burden of proving the relevant 
jurisdictional facts is on the defendant.  However, there is 
clearly a logical tension between the two rules.  Because the 
plaintiff does not have to prove any facts related to the 
applicability of the discretionary function exception, there is 
nothing, at least in terms of facts that the plaintiff is required 
to prove, to which to apply a relaxed standard of proof.  And 
applying that standard to the defendant, and thus allowing the 
defendant to defeat jurisdiction more easily, would be 
inconsistent with the policy underlying our creation of the 
relaxed standard in the first place.  See CNA, 535 F.3d at 145.  
Accordingly, because the Government bears the burden of 
proving the discretionary function exception, the “less in the 
way of jurisdictional proof” standard does not apply. 
                                              
8 It is worth noting that although we hold that the “less 
in the way of jurisdictional proof” standard does not apply 
here because the Government bears the burden of proof, the 
District Court specifically identified the relaxed standard and 
purported to apply it.  Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the 
relaxed standard did apply, S.R.P.’s position would be 
difficult to sustain. 
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of proof.  For example, in CNA v. United States, we applied 
the relaxed standard to the question of whether a federal 
employee was acting within the scope of his employment, as 
required under § 1346(b)(1).  535 F.3d at 145-46.  Similarly, 
in Gould Electronics v. United States, we applied the relaxed 
standard to the question of which state’s substantive law 
controlled the underlying tort action.9
                                              
9 In Gould Electronics v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 
178 (3d Cir. 2000), we stated that “we s[aw] no principled 
reason to distinguish between a jurisdictional determination 
based on the discretionary function exception and one based 
on a conflict of laws analysis.”  We do not see this language 
as a barrier to our conclusion today.  In Gould, we were 
referring to the fact that there was no reason to treat a conflict 
of law inquiry under the FTCA as non-jurisdictional where 
other issues under the FTCA, including the applicability of 
the discretionary function exception, are jurisdictional in 
nature.  Nowhere did we state that the “less in the way of 
jurisdictional proof” standard applies to discretionary 
function exception cases. 
  220 F.3d at 178.  Here, 
in contrast to CNA and Gould, the Government bears the 
burden of proving the necessary jurisdictional facts.  
Accordingly, because the relaxed standard of proof did not 
apply to the question before the District Court, S.R.P.’s 




IV.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court granting the Government’s motion to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
SRP  v. UNITED STATES 
 
No.  10-4011 
          
                                                                                                                                                 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
 I join the majority in affirming the District Court’s 
dismissal of the claims in this case.  I write separately, 
however, because of my concern that the majority’s opinion 
will eviscerate the discretionary function exception by 
inserting an improper element into the analysis of whether 
sovereign immunity has been waived under the FTCA.  In my 
view, (1) the NPS’s knowledge of the risk of barracuda 
attacks and (2) our determination of whether the remedial 
steps necessary to warn of that risk are “garden-variety” are 
both irrelevant to the question of whether the discretionary 
function exception protects the NPS from claims based on the 
content, configuration, location or number of warning signs 
displayed at Buck Island Reef National Monument.  If the 
discretionary function exception applies in a situation in 
which consideration of public policy governs a choice of 
action by a government agency, the “garden-variety” of the 
remedy should not remove the shield of sovereign immunity.  
I fear that the holding of the majority would do just that.  
 
 I agree with a great deal of what the majority has 
stated.  First, the discretionary function exception shields the 
government only from those claims which challenge actions 
that (1) “involve an element of judgment or choice” and that 
(2) are “based on consideration of public policy.”  United 
States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 323 (1991).  I also 
agree that whether an action involves an element of judgment 
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or choice depends entirely on whether “a federal statute, 
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action 
. . ..”  Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988).  If 
an action is specifically prescribed, there is no discretion as to 
how to perform it.  Finally, I agree that, if there is no precise 
statutory, regulatory, or policy prescription for a course of 
action, the determination whether an action is based on public 
policy considerations focuses on the “nature of the action[] 
taken” and whether it is “susceptible to policy analysis. 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 315. 
 
 In this case, involving the National Park Service, an 
examination of the applicable statutes, regulations and 
policies reveals no specific prescription for how the NPS 
should configure warning signs.  To the contrary, NPS 
policies direct that the NPS must exercise discretion in 
deciding why, where, how and when to put up such signs.  
The NPS Management Policies and the NPS Sign Manual 
vest the NPS with the discretion to strike a balance between 
economics, aesthetics and risk in determining the appropriate 
response to hazards in the national parks.  This discretion to 
decide if and how risks will  be warned of includes: 
 
1.  The consideration of what 
measures will have the least 
impact on park resources and 
values.  2001 Management 
Policies, ¶ 8.2.5.1. 
 
2.  The determination of whether 




3.  The allocation to the individual 
park manager of the decision that 
a sign is necessary or appropriate 
for any given location.  Sign 
Manual, ¶ 1-1. 
 
4.  The limitation of signs to the 
minimum number, size and 
wording required to service their 
intended function.  2001  
Management Policies,  ¶ 9.3.1.1. 
 
 Clearly, as provided for in NPS policies, signage in the 
National Parks is based on judgment and choice.  The 
selection and location of signage is, therefore, protected by 
the discretionary function exception.  As stated by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, “the [NPS] policy manuals’ broad 
mandate to warn the public of and protect it from special 
hazards involves the exercise of discretion in identifying such 
hazards, in determining the precise manner in which to warn 
it of those hazards.”  Blackburn v. United States, 100 F.3d 
1426, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). 
 
 In light of this discretion, the extent of the NPS’s 
knowledge of a safety hazard is not relevant to the 
consideration of whether the discretionary function exception 
bars a suit challenging the NPS’s response to that hazard.  
The NPS explicitly has the discretion to set up a system to 
identify threats and to determine the proper warning, if any, 
that should be given to the public of an identified threat.  The 
discretion to warn of a risk encompasses the discretion not to 
warn.  Indeed, the discretion to decide how to define risks 
protects against the possibility of not uncovering a risk.  For 
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instance, in Merando v. United States, 517 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 
2008), where we found the discretionary function exception 
protected the NPS in the system it chose to determine what 
trees in the park might pose a danger to visitors, we 
concluded that it made “no legal distinction” whether the NPS 
was actually aware of the particular hazardous tree which fell.  
In either case, sovereign immunity was not waived.  Id. at 
174.     
 
 Furthermore, even if the NPS were to be negligent in 
its evaluation of the risks that should be warned of, because 
the decision to warn is an exercise of discretion, the 
discretionary function exception applies whether or not the 
discretion has been appropriately exercised.  The sovereign 
immunity waiver of the FTCA specifically states that the 
exception applies “whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused.”  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (emphasis added).  
 
 Under the majority’s theory of this case, however, if 
the government has knowledge of a safety hazard, then its 
response to that hazard is protected by the discretionary 
function exception only if addressing the hazard does not 
require “garden-variety action.”  The majority concluded that 
the decision whether and how to further warn of barracuda 
attacks at Buck Island could potentially be based on a 
weighing of “the potential benefits of additional warnings 
against the costs of such warnings, including the risk of 
numbing Buck Island visitors to all warnings.  Such a 
determination is directly related to the NPS’s mission of 
preserving national parks while ensuring public safety and is 
thus firmly grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime.”  




 The majority goes on, however, to limit this holding by 
stating that “where the Government is aware of a specific risk 
and responding to that risk would only require the 
Government to take garden-variety remedial steps, the 
discretionary function exception does not apply.”  Ante ___. 
[typescript at 19] (emphasis added). 
 
 It is this “garden-variety” language which has 
prompted my concurrence.  If the determination of the hazard 
is protected by the discretionary function exception but the 
risk of liability depends on whether the remedial steps to 
correct or warn of this risk are “garden-variety,” or not, 
haven’t we eviscerated the exception?  Haven’t we protected 
policy choices which require expensive, extensive, or 
complicated remedies, but left the NPS open to liability if the 
remedy is simple or inexpensive?  Indeed, how do you 
differentiate a “garden-variety” warning sign from a sign that 
is not “garden-variety?”       
 
  This “garden-variety” language comes from our 
opinions in Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 
1997) and Cestonaro v. United States, 211 F.3d 749 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The majority claims that this “garden-variety” 
analysis is necessary because of our holding in these two 
cases.  I do not interpret anything in either of those opinions 
to establish such a qualification to the discretionary function 
exception.  Gotha involved the question of lightning and a 
railing on a steep pathway in a U.S. Navy Base.  We held that 
the discretionary function exception did not apply because the 
case was “not about a national security concern, but rather a 
mundane, administrative, garden-variety, housekeeping 
problem that [was] about as far removed from the policies 
applicable to the Navy’s mission as . . . possible.” Gotha, 115 
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F.3d at 181 (emphasis added).  There was no showing of any 
U.S. Navy policy directives concerned with this issue.  Here, 
on the contrary, we do have NPS policy directives on point.  
 
 In Cestonaro, we evaluated whether the discretionary 
function exception barred claims challenging the NPS’s 
response to safety risks in an area on the edge of an NPS park 
that was unofficially used as a parking lot for other places of 
business.  Plaintiff and his decedent had parked there to go to 
a restaurant, not to visit the park.  We stated that “[t]he 
National Park Service’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of the 
dangers in the Hospital Street lot relate more directly to the 
underlying negligence claims than to whether the challenged 
actions . . . were protected by the discretionary function 
exception.”  211 F.3d at 751 n.1.  I can only presume that in 
coming to this conclusion, we did not equate risks of crime in 
an unofficial parking area with the discretion necessary for 
the NPS to determine what hazards within the parks should 
warned of, where the warning should be placed, and how the 
warning should be stated – discretionary matters spelled out 
in NPS policy.  
 
 Therefore, for the reasons stated above, I would hold 
that the NPS’s knowledge of a safety hazard is irrelevant to 
the issue of whether the discretionary function exception bars 
claims challenging NPS’s response to that hazard.  I would 
also hold that whether the measure taken to warn of that 
hazard can be described as a “garden-variety” measure is 
irrelevant.  In my view, the applicability of the discretionary 
function exception is contingent only upon (1) whether a 
federal statute, regulation, or policy prescribes a specific 
response and (2) if not, whether the choice of the response is 
affected by social, economic, or political considerations.  The 
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nature of the proposed remedy -- “garden-variety” or 
otherwise – does not matter.  Because I agree that no statute, 
regulation, or policy explicitly requires the NPS to respond to 
the risk of barracuda attacks in a specific way and that the 
policies of the NPS require discretion in identifying and 
warning of hazards, I would apply the discretionary function 
exception here to bar waiver of sovereign immunity – without 
the “garden-variety” condition imposed by the majority. 
